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I. INTRODUCTION
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Venezuela has historically relied on external sources for its arms
requirements. Therefore, certain percentages of its annual defense
expenditures, when arms procurement is involved for a particular fiscal
year, is used as foreign exchange to pay for those arms.
This thesis is intended to present a critical analysis of the arms
transfers to Venezuela for the time period 1962-1975. The analysis
will be made by considering the arms transfers a part of a more complex
process, the arms acquisition process, which includes the most relevant
factors influencing the different stages from the appearance of the need
until the selection of the source.
The less developed nations usually get others attention when they
allocate part of their national resources, represented in the national
budget or government expenditures, to purchase weapons in the inter-
national market.
Nevertheless, it is well known that Latin America is the developing
region that spends less of its resources in arms imports, at least it
was, for the period 1966-1977. Out of a total $ 45,812 million worth
of arms transferred to the less developed world in 1966-1977 a 5.4 per-
cent corresponded to Latin America, Cuba excluded. This low key figure
is representative of the unique stability that has existed in the
region for the last three decades.
More internal conflicts have threatened the stability of certain




Research done in the field of military expenditures and arms imports
in and to Latin America has focused on trying to find the factors influ-
encing or causing a generalized behavior. Most of all, the research
criticizes nations which are spending a portion of their economic output
in the sector of least or no productivity. Many scholars have often
argued that since Latin American countries have no genuine military
requirements for sophisticated and expensive armaments, they should be
spending their scarce resources on schools and hospitals rather than
in arms [Ref. 26, p. 189].
However, the justification for these opinions are seldom formulated
in a clear and profound manner.
This thesis is an attempt to analyze the arms transfers to Venezuela
over a period of 14 years using a model that corresponds to a rational
arms acquisition process. Thus the assumption of rationality is taken
as given and any contradiction to this assumption shall be appearing by
itself as the analysis goes on.
This research effort will focus on one specific country, a study
that apparently has not been done before since the available literature
concentrates on Latin America as a whole rather than on specific
situations.
Although most of Latin America presents similar cultural traits,
language, and politically independent life, more or less economic
development in certain countries make more difficult the adoption of
assumptions to treat the whole region under one singular model.
Venezuela, as any other society, develops policies for achieving
its foreign and domestic goals. Because implementing these separate
policies requires economic and political resources, trade-offs are
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inevitable. A major focus of these trade offs is military policy, which
attempts to meet the demands made on its component by foreign policy
with material and political resources supplied by domestic policy.
Using the foregoing statement as a philosophical basis for this
analysis, the thesis begins with Chapter II presenting a brief background
of the Venezuelan arms acquisition patterns for the years 1938-1961.
Chapter III continues with a broad discussion of the need for a
defense establishment and in turn the need for arms, giving special
emphasis to the question of arms control and self-reliance. This chapter
represents the first stage of the arms acquisition process.
Military material procurement alternatives have to satisfy both
military requirements and domestic goals. In peace time periods the
emphasis of society is placed on domestic goals or a balance among the
various objectives. The question is to determine a balance among the
various military and domestic goals considering their relative impor-
tance and the impact on them of military material procurement.
Chapter IV is an attempt at presenting the factors that influenced or
were considered to influence the issue of military requirements and
the demands for arms, stage II in the arms acquisition process.
A nation does not need to become an arms manufacturer to satisfy its
requirements for weapons that can not be procured from internal sources.
Chapter V deals with the final stage, as treated in this model, of the
arms acquisition process and that is the selection of the supplier
once the needs for arms are assumed to be valid and the resources to
procure them are authorized and/or allocated. Within the source
selection process the interaction among recipient and suppliers is




The trends and implications of the arms transfers concerning the
time period 1962-1975, and as inferred from the analysis developed from
Chapter III to V are the conclusive part of the thesis.
It is of great concern for the author, as a Venezuelan military
officer, to emphazise that this study is an individual work which does
not reflect under any circumstances the policy or doctrine of the
Venezuelan Armed Forces. The author's intention shall be rewarded if
this paper has any significant value to the interested reader, particu-
larly the American reader, to whom is addressed.
B . METHODOLOGY
1. Statistical Data
Once the decision of using "the acquisition process" as a model
for describing the Venezuelan arms imports patterns was taken, the next
difficulty came in finding available and reliable sources of information,
particularly statistical data.
Since the primary statistical data the author was able to obtain
from Venezuela covered the period 1962 to 1975, it was assumed that 14
years would make a reasonable and acceptable number of sample-data in
case any correlation was necessary. All statistical data obtained from
Venezuela was in local currency (Bolivares ) and corresponded to govern-
ment expenditures, defense expenditures, government income, and oil
revenues.
It was accepted that the available data for the period 1962-1975
would represent valid information concerning the defense expenditures
trends of a civilian democracy established since 1959. Thus, no
reference is made to past military regimes with the exception of a brief
comment in Chapter II.
13

The statistical data mentioned above was drawn from publications
concerning the annual budgets available from the Ministry of the Treasury
(Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Presupuesto, Resumen del
Presupuesto ) and also from extracts of several Budget Laws corresponding
to the intervening period (Gaceta Oficial de Venezuela, Ley del Presu-
puesto ) . The figures represent actual outlays or receipts as reconciled
on subsequent budgets.
Other statistical data used in the paper were obtained from
secondary sources including: gross domestic product (GDP) for 1962-1974,
from the Yearbook of National Account Statistics, United Nations, and
the GDP for 1975 from the International Financial Statistics,
International Monetary Fund, both in Bolivares ; the consumer price index
and the exchange rate (selling rate) used to convert selected data to
1970 dollars were drawn from the International Financial Statistics.
Conversion to 1970 dollars was made by taking the figures in
local currency, convert them to 1970 Bolivares and then dividing each
value by the 1970 selling rate (4.49). The consumer price index was
used as a deflator because it represents an acceptable measure of
inflation of the national economy.
Difficulty in getting reliable monetary values of arms transfers
to Venezuela from primary sources, has constrained the author to the use
of available secondary sources in obtaining such information. The U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA) compiles the most timely
figures after 1964 in its annually published World Military Expenditures,
and for the period 1962-1964, from the same agency the 1974 Report to
Congress, the International Transfer of Conventional Arms.
14

The values of arms transfers given by USACDA represent transfer
under "...credit, or cash sales terms of military equipment usually
referred to as "conventional," including weapons of war, parts thereof,
ammunition, support equipment and other commodities considered primarily
military in nature." [Ref. 61, p. 8] The USACDA statistics are estimates
of the value of goods actually delivered during the reference year, in
contrast to the value of programs, agreements, contracts or orders which
may result in a future transfer of articles.
2. Terminology
The term "arms" as it is used throughout this paper represent
major items of war: naval vessels, tanks, self-propelled guns, artillery,
armored cars, aircraft, and missiles, including support parts. The
"arms" term is used interchangeable with the following terms: weapons,
weapon systems, materiel, hardware, and armament.
Defense expenditures do not include outlays assigned to the
Armed Forces' social welfare and recreation functions, not to the
autonomous agency administering the national shipyards which, until 1976
was under jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. National Guard
expenditures have also been excluded from the defense expenditures.
Although the National Guard forms part of Venezuelan Armed Forces, its
mission falls more appropriately under the state security forces mission
as will be explained in Chapter III. The defense expenditures expression
will be used interchangeable with military spending, expenditures or
outlays and also with Armed Forces expenditures.
Other terms that will be commonly interchanged are arms transfers
and arms imports, referring both to the monetary value of the items
actually received in a particular time period by the Venezuelan Armed
Forces. The regional name of Latin America, as used in this thesis,
consists of Central and South America, including Mexico in Central America.

II. BACKGROUND
A. ARMS ACQUISITION PATTERNS: 1938-1961
This thesis will focus on the acquisition pattern of Venezuela after
1961. Therefore, some background before that year is necessary.
Venezuela, as most of the Latin American nations, has depended on
the industrialized world for its supply of arms.
Before the early 1950s Venezuela's weapons inventory was composed
mainly of war surplus and aged materiel. Among the first supplier-
nations were Canada, Italy, and the United States (U.S.). Normally,
the military equipment had been transferred from their armed forces
inventories thus consisting of used arms, sometimes refitted. The
Italian Navy had transferred two gunboats while Canada had transferred
six corvettes. From the U.S. the Venezuelan Navy had received one
LST transport and some coast guard boats.
In 1950, the Venezuelan Air Force was equipped with its first
jet-aircraft. DH Vampire fighters and refurbished Canberras bombers
were transferred from the United Kingdom. The Army began to receive
surplus armored fighting vehciles from the U.S., among these were:
the M-3 Sherman, the M-2 and the M-9. With the second-generation of
jet-fighters and fighter-bombers supplied by the United Kingdom, the
Air Force had the newest equipment compared to that possessed by the
Army and the Navy.
Understandably the Armed Forces' inventory was highly diversified
and lacked standardization. The possession of such inadequate military
equipment created severe limitations on the effectiveness of the defense
establishment particularly for the Navy and the Army. In view of that
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situation, the military government began to seek international suppliers
in order to modernize the Armed Forces 1 inventory.
In 1955, after a reduction in defense expenditures, which had dropped
2.0 percent the year before, the military government increased defense
spending to an unprecedented amount of $105.3 million (see Table I
page 91 ) . This was the first time that military outlays had reached
the one hundred million dollars level and, from there on it would stay
over it. By 1961 Venezuela had spent, in aggregated value, since 1955,
$1.03 billion, an amount 67 percent larger than the one spent during the
time period 1938-1954. The high defense expenditures for the years
1955-1961 may be explained, as being the result of the program of
modernization began by the Armed Forces in the early 1950s.
The need for modernization called for new armament rather than
surplus or used materiel.
New equipment, particularly major equipment, was transferred from
the U.S., Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. For the Armed Forces,
the renovation program brought about reorganization in its functional
and tactical structure in order to adapt to new techniques and technology
accompanying the military hardware. The Army complemented its ex-U.S.
armored fighting cars with the French AMX-13 tank, a light and very
versatile weapon, which had been one of the most successful post-war
designs [Ref. 25, p. 208].
Perhaps the most visible change was for the Navy, from an old-
generation of gunboats and corvettes the Navy obtained custom-order
destroyers and frigates from the United Kingdom and Italy respectively.
Those ships became integrated into the first modern squadron of the
Venezuelan Navy, and were designed, primarily, for use in anti-submarine
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operations (ASW) . Coastal patrol crafts as well as a light personnel
transport were built in French shipyards. These patrol boats were
handed over to the National Guard for missions of port vigilance and
ant i- smuggling control.
The Air Force received most of its equipment from the U.S. such
as light transports, trainers, fighters, and some light aircraft mainly
through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program begun in 1950 [Ref. 14,
p. 2]. Great Britain, the traditional European supplier of the Air
Force equipment, transferred Venom and Vampire combat aircraft as well
as Canberra light bombers and Canberra reconnaissance aircraft.
Venezuela, during the period 1950-1961, had arms imports valued at
$150 million. 1
Corresponding to a more highly technological inventory, the Armed
Forces tried to develop better logistics support. Manpower development
and material support (spares, maintenance and overhaul) increased the
monetary value of military requirements and thus the defense budget.
Even so, there were years in which military outlays decreased (1957,
1960, and 1961). The drop in 1957 is difficult to explain, given at
that time the country was ruled by a military government. While, in
1960 and 1961, a civilian administration, which had been freely elected
in 1959, gave priority to other sectors of the nation, thus decreasing
the defense budget.
The figure is an estimate obtained from the following sources:
(1) U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (ISA) , Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts
,
December 1976; (2) U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Inter-
national Transfer of Conventional Arms
,
April 1974; and (3) SIPRI, The
Arms Trade with the Third World , Humanities Press, 1971.
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The main point to be emphasized from the arms acquisition patterns
of the Venezuelan Armed Forces up to 1961, is the arms transfers of the
1950s brought a new philosophy to the military organization. Not only was
there possession of modern weapons but also a sense of professionalism
and higher satisfaction within the Armed Forces establishment.
A second finding of Venezuela's arms acquisition trends during the
years 1950-1961 is the diversification of sources which in turn created




III. THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT AND
THE NEEDS FOR ARMS
A. NATIONAL SECURITY
1. A Legal Instrument
Venezuela's Constitution proclaims the principles of national
independence, security, peace, and stability. It advocates international
cooperation, democracy, and self-determination of people and repudiates
war, conquest and economic predominance as instruments of international
policy.
National sovereignty is asserted over all of the land and air-
space and over the territorial sea three nautical miles from the coast
plus an additional nine-mile contiguous zone and the continental shelf.
The legal instrument to assure and to warrant the national
defense is, according to the article 132 of theConstitution* the Armed
Forces. They have been created by the state to protect its citizens
and the inviolability of the national territory.
2. Internal Security
In its article 132 Venezuela's Constitution states:
The National Armed Forces form a nonpolitical,
obedient and nondeliverative institution, organized
by the State to insure the national defense, the
stability of democratic institutions, and respect
for the Constitution and the laws, the observance
of which shall always be above any other obligation.
The National Armed Forces shall be in the service of
the Republic, and in no case in that of any person
or political party.
The framers of the Constitution felt a need for stating therein
that the role of the Armed Forces shall be in the service of the republic,
and not in that of individuals or groups. Thus, the Armed Forces own
loyalty to the republic and its legal powers.

By law the Armed Forces after its first constitutional obligation
and raison d'etre, that of defending the integrity, independence and
freedom of the nation, shall:
(1) insure the fulfillment of the constitution and the laws;
(2) maintain the public order;
(3) protect legal traffic, industries and commerce;
(4) support the legally constituted authorities and functionaries
according to the laws and military regulations;
(5) protect persons and their properties; and
(6) prevent the infringement of laws and regulations of navigation,
2
commerce and fishing, and international treaties.
Commonly, the Armed Forces of Cooperation (also known as National
Guard) has had a major share of the responsibilities for internal
security throughout the country, particularly in times of political
stability. The National Guard, which has been part of the National
Armed Forces as a fourth service since 1937, is also supposed to
cooperate in national defense, in cases of emergency, with the regular
army units.
The National Guard has been working in close relationship with
national and local police in keeping public order and has had additional
assignments within other Ministries such as: Communications, Treasury,
Agriculture and Livestock, Justice, and Mines and Hydrocarbons. Through
such activities as: protecting custom duties in ports, airports and
frontier posts; other enforcement functions with the Ministry of Treasury
2
The Venezuelan Navy and a lesser extent the National Guard have carried
out coast guard missions.
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(liquor tax laws, salt tax laws, etc.); preventing smuggling; forest
service; enforcement of hunting and fishing laws; police service in
national penitentiaries; law enforcement in national highways; security
service in areas of mineral exploitation; and protection of industrial
facilities owned by the state (petrochemicals, electricity, water works
and steel plants among others). According to the 1972 Budget Law, the
regular forces assigned to the above mentioned duties amounted to a 45
percent of the National Guard. The remaining personnel had duties in
defense and public security [Ref. 67, p. 23].
In the early 1960s during the first democratic and constitutional
government after the fall of the military regime in 1958, a succession
of attempts at overthrowing a new government were deterred by the state
security forces and the Armed Forces. The insurgent groups were
integrated from both right and left, whether civilian and/or military,
and were dissidents who wanted to seize power by means other than
electoral votes.
The hostile environment at that time demanded the legal intervention
of the Armed Forces in supporting the government's effort to restrain
the violence. From 1962 to 1968 the Armed Forces had to apportion its
regular forces to deal with a domestic enemy. The internal threat was,
primarily, represented by leftist guerrillas, particularly rural
3guerrillas, which were being motivated by Cuba.
The intensity of the extremist internal threat decreased in 1969,
and for the early 1970s was almost insignificant. In 1973 the guerrillas
had virtually dissappeared in Venezuela and with it any evidence of Cuban
intervention.
3 Venezuela had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961, and on
November 29, 1963, requested before the OAS measures against the Cuban
Government under accusations of intervention and aggression affecting the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Venezuela.
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B. DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY
The military establishment constitutes an instrument at the disposal
of the nation, just as diplomatic, economic, and other means are
available and may be applied to achieve national objectives. The nature
of defense planning is such that elements of the nation's defense posture
tend to be sensitive in a number of respects to considerations of geo-
politics. To the extent that the assumptions about those considerations
evolve, the Venezuela defense posture may evolve as well. These con-
siderations will be discussed in the next sections.
1. Political Factors
Venezuela, since independence, has never faced a serious threat
of invasion by a foreign power, nor has it resorted to arms in any
international dispute. However, this lack of belligerence, relatively
speaking, does not imply an absence of external involvement in Venezuela's
military affairs.
President Carlos Andres Perez said, addressing a military
audience in 1976, that Venezuela did not create its Armed Forces doctrine
for aggressive actions against any one nation and that no Venezuelan flag
has ever been raised in foreign territory unless it had been as a
confraternity gesture, to the other Latin American nations [Ref . 42,
p. 68]. This policy, besides being implied in the Constitution,
has been practiced by the Venezuelan Governments since independence.
But, the action of carrying out this type of foreign policy is
not mutually exclusive with the nation's obligation of being able to
deal with any threat or challenge to its own existence. As the President
stated it: "...the arms of the Republic are for defending it, for




In another speech, the President noted that:
"Our enormous natural resources, the will of having
a nationalistic policy that it shall make us authentic
owners of our great national destiny, imply the forma-
tion of an armed force and of a defense capacity in
which must participate, not only the divisions of our
Army but all the Venezuelans..." [Ref. 42, p. 67]
Within the Organization of American States (OAS) charter
Venezuela had sought external alliance with the American countries.
The Rio Treaty has been an instrument of counterbalancing military
interventions of extracontinental powers and a means of resolving
promptly, if not peaceably, any regional conflict.
The mutual defense treaty in which Venezuela has had a member-
ship is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at
Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, under the auspices of the Organi-
zation of American States. This treaty constitutes the principal and
unique defense mechanism of the American States (particularly for the
Latin American nations) against external aggression, and also a means
for dealing, expenditious, with regional conflicts (particularly for
neighboring countries)
.
2. Arms Control and Self-Reliance
Venezuela, has been active in the campaign against the pro-
liferation and use of nuclear energy for purposes of building weapons.
It was one of the first signatories and parties of the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America, also known as Treaty
of Tlatelolco, signed in 1967 and brought into force on April 22, 1968.
The agreement was the first preventive measure to deal with a populated
area. It commits the 22 Latin American signatory nations to prevent in
their respective territories "the testing, use, manufacture, production,
or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons..." There
24

are two protocols to the treaty dealing with matters that concern non-
Latin American countries. Protocol I calls on nations outside the
treaty zone with territories in the zone to place them under the same
restrictions as the treaty parties. From the nations having such
territories, the United States and France have not signed the protocol.
In protocol II, nuclear-weapons countries undertake to respect the
denuclearized status of the zone. From those nations, the Soviet
Union has not adhered to Protocol II [Ref. 59, p. 15]. Venezuela is
also party of the following unilateral arms control agreements: Limited
Test Ban Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
Geneva Protocol and it has signed the Biological Weapons Convention.
The Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs addressing the
United Nation's General Assembly in 1976 pointed out that Venezuela was
concerned at the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Existing treaties
had not been fully subscribed to; it was disturbing to note that provid-
ing nuclear installations for peaceful purposes could be converted to
using nuclear energy for war purposes [Ref. 56, p. 112].
Latin America was the only region that had shown signs of interest
4in limiting arms imports. In 1974 the six Andean Pact states plus
Panama and Argentina agreed in the Declaration of Ayacucho to seek a
cooperative means of limiting their arms acquisitions. Before 1974,
Venezuela had joined in 1967 the other members of the OAS in a statement
expressing their intention to limit military expenditures in proportion
to the actual demands of national security, and in accordance with each
country's constitutional provisions; but at the same time the nations
recognized the importance of the armed forces in maintaining security
[Ref. 5, p. 661].
4
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
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While Venezuela has shown an active interest in questions of
disarmament and reduction of military expenditures not only regionally*
within the OAS ,but internationally [Ref. 55, p. 28], it has rejected
any attempt of arms control where the issue has been aimed at selective
areas instead of being a collective goal.
In 1977, the Minister of Defense pointed out that the Venezuelan
Armed Forces were doing a study about arms transfers (armament ismo ) in
Latin America. The study once completed would be considered by the
President, who is responsible for setting the policy on the matter [Ref. 3,
p. 1].
3. Economic Factors
Venezuela's Constitution rejects economic predominance as an
instrument of international policy.
Since the advent of democratic governments into the political
life of Venezuela in 1959, the various administrations have sought to
promote the nation's independence in the economic field.
In 1960, a Venezuelan initiative was largely responsible for
the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
with the Arab nations in order to maintain the export price of oil. The
OPEC gave value to a resource that today has won global rank. It has
played a significant role for Venezuela, mainly because the oil has
represented the principal source of government income. In 1963 oil
revenues reached $1,406 million, 71 percent of the government income.
In 1975 the share had increased to 79 percent of the government income
In November, 1976, President Perez, in a state visit to Moscow, said
that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were not doing enough to end the
armaments race [Ref. 75, p. 929].
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and oil revenues were $7,590 million (see Figure 1). Oil exports, for
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Year
Figure 1. Oil Revenues and
Government Income, 1963-1975.
Source: See Table II.
A greater dependence on oil and iron ore, the latter in lesser
importance, has made Venezuela, blessed in having inherited a rich
resource base in those valuable items, a leading defender of the less
developed nations (particularly Latin American nations) in their attempt
to change the global economic relationships [Ref. 76, p. 65]. From
President Romulo Betancourt's involvement in 1960 to get international
attention on the export prices for oil and iron ore to the nationalization
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of the oil and iron industries by means of laws promulgated under
President Perez administration, Venezuela has conducted an economic
policy of less dependence.
Venezuela, in the interest of panamericanism has also promoted
and supported regional agreements for economic cooperation such as: the
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) , the Andean Pact (similar
to the European Common Market) and more recently the Latin American
Economic System (LAES)
.
But the Venezuelan economic policy of less dependence from the
industrialized nations has not disregarded the real situation of its
economic development. Venezuela has maintained friendly and close
commercial relationships with the U.S., Canada, Europe, Japan, and lately
has initiated a movement to improve its trade with communist countries.
Venezuela's nationalism symbolized by the administration of its
own natural resources and a still incipient economic development has
come to emphazise the need for a defense establishment, whose presence,
mainly represented by the possession of a modern armaments, might act as
an instrument of unity and motivation. A sense of security and solidarity
ties citizens to a nation-state especially in times of national signifi-
cance [Ref. 27, p. 28], and serves as a support for ambitious projects
which might require the whole nation behind them.
"The Armed Institution is a symbol of the national sovereignty,
and what at this time is important for the country, the responsibility
The iron and oil industries were nationalized on January 1, 1975,
and on January 1, 1976, respectively.
Referring to his visit to the Soviet Union in 1977, the President
said that Venezuela will increase trade with that country as a beneficial
interest to both nations [Ref. 36, p. 1].
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of all Venezuelans, is the affirmation of the economic sovereignty of
Venezuela over its natural resources..." These words were expressed by
the Venezuelan President on January 1976 at the swearing in ceremony of
the new Minister of Defense [Ref. 29, p. 6]. They reflect the singular
position that the Armed Forces have received in the context of national
security and national development, a position of protection and defense
of Venezuela's natural resources.
4. Strategic Factors
The nature of Venezuela's political and economic interests
inevitably brings other interests in focus. Venezuela greatly depends
on the seas for the bulk of its external commerce. At least where
Venezuela proclaims authority and sovereignty it should be able to exert
it. The freedom of communication on the Caribbean Sea and on the part
of the Atlantic Ocean contiguous to the Venezuelan coast is essential
to Venezuela. The nation has been vitally interested in this matter
and its Navy, with conventional, but modern forces has played its role
with a peaceful and quiet performance.
Not only Venezuela's individual action to protect its lines of
communications but regional cooperation with other American nations
have deployed the Venezuelan Navy to the seas. As far back as the Second
World War (in support of the allied cause) the Venezuelan Navy has
contributed to the free traffic and protection of lines of communication
on the Caribbean Sea, including the quarantine patrol, with other American
Navies, of Cuba in 1962 [Ref. 78, p. 261].
In a speech during a military ceremony in 1976 the Commanding
General of the Venezuelan Navy said: "With the nationalization of the
iron and the oil..., the protection to the sovereignty in our jurisdictional

Q
maritime areas and inland waters is every day a more urgency imperative."
Later in the same speech he added referring to the other American Navies,
that he would promote combined exercises in order to improve their capa-
bility to the hemispheric defense and to unify and fortify the inter-
american tactical-strategic doctrine [Ref. 16, p. 60].
Perhaps the biggest strategic significance of Venezuela, besides
its access to important maritime lines of communication into the
Caribbean, is its wealth of natural resources, many relatively untapped:
petroleum and iron ore reserves, as well as the almost unexplored Federal
Territory of the Amazonas which is part of the Guayana Highlands, a vast
area of high plateaus and rolling plains south and east of the Orinoco
River, comprising 45 percent of the national territory (see (1) in
Figure 2) . Among the resources of the latter area it is said that there
are mineral deposits such as: oil, iron, probably bauxite, titanium,
and uranium [Ref. 35, p. 172].
5. Venezuela and Its Border
Venezuela's Constitution defined the nation's territory in
article 7: "The national territory is the one that corresponded to the
Captaincy General of Venezuela before the political transformation
initiated in 1810 with the modifications resulted in the valid treaties
concluded by the Republic."
Also, the Constitution has incorporated the country's commitment
to the peaceful settlement of controversies. Article 129 states:
Q
Venezuela's biggest lake is Lake Maracaibo which has been the main
oil production area in the Northwestern part of the country. The Orinoco
River flows, more than 1,300 miles to the Atlantic and as the Lake








In international treaties, conventions, and agreements
concluded by the Republic, there shall be inserted a
clause by which the parties bind themselves to decide
by peaceful means recognized by international law or
previously agreed to by them, if such is the case, all
controversies that may arise between the parties by
reason of their interpretation or execution, if not
inapplicable, and if permitted by the procedure
followed in their conclusion.
Since the withdrawal from the Grand Colombia federation in 1830,
Venezuelan Governments have frequently been occupied with boundary
delimitations, and there still remain some controversies about the precise
boundaries of the nation. These boundary problems were a consequence of
the vagueness of the Spanish delineation of the boundaries of the former
captaincy general [Ref. 32, p. 168].
Venezuela has been negotiating separate boundary agreements
with Colombia in the west, Brazil in the south and Guyana, former
British Guiana, in the east. Although there have been controversies, all
cases hitherto have peaceably been settled.
With Brazil, limits were defined under the terms of agreements
of 1852, 1859, 1905, and 1928. Most of the 1,243 mile boundary with
Brazil, based almost entirely on watersheds and small rivers, were entirely
delineated and marked by the members of mixed commissions in 1970.
Negotiations with Colombia have been more prolonged and involved.
Both countries agreed that the boundary dividing their territories should
be the line of the Uti possidetis juris of 1810. In 1941, after more
than a century of negotiations, both parties finally reached a definitive
agreement. The 1,274 miles of the Colombian frontier was totally
delineated. Spain in 1891 and the Swiss Confederation in 1922 had been
called to arbitrate the boundary. The decision handed down by both the
Spain crown and Switzerland were accepted by Venezuela and Colombia. It
was in 1941 when remaining demarcation questions were resolved.
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In spite of the definitive territorial boundary with Colombia
reached in 1941, there was still some controversy about the ownership
of a small group of unoccupied islands, the Los Monjes Archipelago,
just off the Guajira Peninsula (see (2) in Figure 2). It was not until
1952 when Colombia finally withdrew its claim in favor of Venezuela,
thus ending the dispute.
While in 1976 no important questions remained unresolved con-
cerning the continental boundary with Colombia, one that is proving to
be difficult to resolve had emerged with respect to sovereignty over
the waters of the Gulf of Venezuela (see (3) in Figure 2) . Quiet
diplomatic talks between the two nations had been held intermittently
since 1970. In July, 1976 the Presidents of Colombia and Venezuela
suscribed a communique where, among other points, they reiterated their
decision to proceed with the promptly demarcation of the marine and
submarine areas between Venezuela and Colombia [Ref. 49, p. 3].
The most difficult boundary delimitation has been on the east
with Guyana.
Since independence Venezuela's boundary line on the east was
the Esequibo River. On the other side of the river was Great Britian
trying to extend its Guiana territory to the west of the Esequibo River
during the years 1810-1821, years in which Venezuela was fighting the
independence war against Spain. In effect, British Colonials settled
westward of the Esequibo River. After unsuccessful discussions between
Venezuela and Great Britain, and the intervention of U.S. asking for an
arbitration to solve the problem, the Arbitral Award of 1899 established
the boundary in such a way that Venezuela lost a substantial part of its
territory in the Guayana Esequiba. This Arbitral Award has not been
accepted by Venezuela, claiming it was illegal [Ref. 11, p. 7].

In 1962 Venezuela reopened the issue and in 1966 signed with
Great Britain the Ginebra Agreement in which both nations shall look for
satisfactory solutions to the controversy. Later on the same year (1966)
the British Colony won its independence and under the name of Guyana
entered also into the agreement. After four years of negotiations no
solution was reached and Venezuela kept its claims on the territory
west of the Esequibo River (see (4) in Figure 2) , Guyana did not accept
the claim. In 1970 Venezuela, Guyana, and Great Britain signed at
Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, the so-called Protocol of Port-of-Spain. The
Protocol stated that no claim shall be made during the time of its force
(12 years) by either country, Venezuela and/or Guyana. In the meantime
both nations should explore all the possibilities to improve the under-
standing of them and their people.
C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Venezuela has historically been a pacific nation in the international
and regional content. The principles of national independence, security,
peace and stability are treated as constitutional mandates. A respect
for those principles seems to be part of Venezuela itself and of its
people and governments. The existence of the Armed Forces seems to give
the nation a sense of security not only in the regional scenario, which
might be the primordial consideration, but internally.
The Venezuelan Armed Forces has played a significant role in internal
security, particularly during the 1960s, and it might be expected to
play the same role in the future, as long as it is legally required in
the Constitution.




(1) the right of people for self determination;
(2) contrary to any form of colonialism;
(3) peaceful settlement of disputes between nations;
(4) the right of all people to peace, security and stability;
(5) support of arms control, regionally and internationally as well;
(6) use of primary products particularly petroleum to dignify
exchange between industrialized nations and the less developed countries;
and
(7) economic integration of the Latin American nations.
On the regional content there are obligations to a defense treaty,
Rio Treaty, and on the international scenario Venezuela has clearly
defined a democratic orientation as its own and preferred way of living.
It repudiates acts of aggression but at the same time recognizes the
need to defend its sovereignty and natural resources.
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IV. MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND THE DEMAND FOR ARMS
A. FORCE STRUCTURE
In the preceding chapter internal and external points were discussed
under the national security and foreign policy headings.
Both missions, internal security and external defense, the latter
being more a dissuasive strength, are determinants of the composition
of the Armed Forces. The responsibilities of national defense, external
and domestic, have constitutionally been delegated to the main three
services: Army, Navy and Air Force. A fourth service, the National
Guard, has specific functions in internal security, customs and forestry.
This paper will not discuss the National Guard organization nor its
military expenditures.
. Table III page 93 delineates the estimated composition of the
Venezuelan Armed Forces for the year 1975.
The force structure is included to provide a reference for discussing
the military requirements and arms demand.
B. THE DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
1. The Military Requirement Process
Requirements related to the national defense have fallen under
the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense through the autonomous
services Army, Navy, and Air Force. Since 1958, when by decree of the
Junta de Gobierno the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created, the Commanding
General of each Service (Service's Chief of Staff) has been responsible
for the "command, organization, administration, and instruction" of his
own branch. Each branch budget was separated by chapters and all of

them plus the organization of the Ministry of Defense, which included
the administration of common services (e.g. , Military Engineering Service),
were grouped under the defense budget.
The Superior Junta of the Armed Forces, an advisory group to
the Ministry of Defense, according to law is consulted when acquisition
of new armament is involved. The Junta is integrated by the Minister
of Defense who presides over it, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Commanding General of each Service, four Officers General or
Superior (one for each service) as appointed by the Minister of Defense,
the General Counsel of the Ministry of Defense, and the Director of the
Service of Military Justice who acts as its secretary [Ref. 4, p. 46].
The final decision over military requirements rests on the
President of the Republic. He acts as the Commander-in-Chief of the
National Armed Forces and also as the head administrator of the public
9
treasury. This key position also allows the President, under consti-
tutional mandate, to establish the size of the Armed Forces.
2. The Resource Allocation Process
The President oversees the budget preparation and expenditures
process as it develops in the different ministries.
During the budget preparation the Ministry of the Treasury might
influence the relative size of national funds to be allocated to the
public administration, including the military budget. That influence is
a result of constraints such as limited resources and the president's
9 See Venezuela, Constitucion de la Republica de Venezuela , Article 190,
Sections 3,4 and 12 (Presidential powers) [Ref. 66].
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budgetary policy, and is done through the Council of the Budget. The
council can object to the expenditures submitted by the Ministry of
Defense first, by a detailed objection in writing and subsequently by
reporting to the Council of Ministers for final decision concerning the
presentation of the budget to Congress.
At Congress, the Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies
is responsible of receiving and discussing the budget. Congress, par-
ticularly the Finance Committee, can alter the amounts in budgetary
entries but it cannot authorize expenditures which exceed the total
expected revenues for the fiscal year in discussion. Thus, Congress
also is able to influence the allocation of funds for defense procurements
Once the resource allocation process is completed an auxiliary
body of Congress, the Office of the Comptroller General, has the
functions of inspecting and auditing governmental income and expenditures
and the operations related to them. The Comptroller General can object to
any defense acquisitions on basis of contractual conditions but his
objections are not binding on the Ministry of Defense or the President.
The Constitution does not allow expenditures by the National
Treasury unauthorized in the Budget Law. The President might decree
additional credit laws to the budget to cover expenditures unforeseen
or other expenditures for which the initial allocations resulted
insufficient, and as long as the National Treasury has the monetary
resources to finance the respective credit. The decree for additional
An advisory body presided over by the Minister of the Treasury and
formed by him and thirteen other members, two appointed by the Minister
of the Treasury, and one by each other Minister, and others appointed
by the autonomous agencies.

credits has to be voted at the Council of Ministers and has to be
authorized by Congress ina joint session. The credits opened in each
budget might not be used for expenditures that have not arisen during
the corresponding fiscal year.
For example, in September 29, 1976 Congress authorized nineteen
additional credits for a total of U.S. $1,246,968,828 (5,426,716,273
Bolivares ) . Of these credits two corresponded to arms procurement:
(1) to cover expenditures caused by construction of six frigates for the
Venezuelan Navy, U.S. $86,411,372 ( 370,704,593 Bolivares ); and (2) to
finance the credit agreement with the United States Government, U.S.
$2,103,066 ( 9,022,153 Bolivares ) [Ref. 9, p. 6]. The authorization of
those credits may have reflected additional and available resources
coming from the increases in oil prices.
It becomes apparent that the allocation process for defense
expenditures may be influenced by more than one organization after it
has been initiated in the respective service and before being passed by
Congress. Nevertheless, once the funds are allocated the decision of
what to buy and where to buy is more a decision of the military service
consulting as deemed necessary with the Superior Junta of the Armed
Forces and ultimately the President.
C. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
Military requirements are defined as "the need or demand for personnel,
equipment, supplies, resources, facilities, or services by specific
quantities, for specific periods of time or at specific time." [Ref. 80,
p. 57] Those needs or demands are more or less satisfied depending on
the national conditions existing at the time they are requested. At a
particular time, some factors may favor the total fulfillment of the

Armed Forces' needs (e.g., external conflict, internal instability,
military influence, etc.) even where other national sectors (education,
welfare, etc.) have to be affected. On the other hand, at any other
time different factors may act against the total satisfaction of the
Armed Forces' demands (political, economic, internal stability, etc.).
As the military requirements of the defense establishment include
the demands for arms and since this thesis is more concerned with the latter
variable, it is necessary to assume that the mention to the former factor
implicitly refers also to the demands for arms.
At this point, another assumption is to be made. Whether partial
or total military requirements are satisfied, they will be fully repre-
sented by the defense expenditures corresponded to any particular fiscal
year. Thus, in discussing the factors that influenced the military
requirements during the period 1962-1975, the military outlays for the
same interval would be assumed to be representative of the former.
1. Budgetary Policy
Under the budgetary policy, military requirements are viewed as
the outcome of fiscal and planning processes at the national level and
the necessary division of scarce resources among the services of the
Armed Forces at the Ministry of Defense level. Of course, other factors
such as military lobbying before the political groups which integrate
the budget decision-making process, and competition between services,
may well be implicit parts of that process.
If military requirements were satisfied just by following a
routine and bureaucratic process year after year, then it is reasonable
to expect that certain relationship would have existed between defense
expenditures and government expenditures for the intervening period.
Both, military and government expenditures are shown in Table IV page 95.
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A simple regression analysis, using government expenditures as
the independent variable (X axis) and defense expenditures as the depen-
dent variable (Y axis) was computed. The scattergram is shown in
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Figure 3. Scattergram of Defense Expenditures by
Government Expenditures, 1962-1975.
(In millions of 1970 dollars)
increased so did defense expenditures. The sample correlation coefficient
r with a value of 0.95 points out that a relationship between government
The sample correlation coefficient r has always a value between -1
and +1 inclusive [Ref. 41, p. 279]. Like the population coefficient,
an r close to +1 indicates a positive relationship and vice versa when
r is close to -1. The relationship being stronger as closest the r
is to either value.
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expenditures and defense expenditures may exist. The dispersion of
the two points at the upper right hand of the graph, may be explained
with a look at the Table IV. As a result of the oil price increase
in 1973 the national budget went up in 1974 and stayed at that level
in 1975, actually there was a slight reduction. Because of the
apparently positive association of defense expenditures with government
expenditures the former also increased.
Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis using absolute values of
defense expenditures, does not tell the reader how the increases were
related to the level of other factors in the national budget. To account
for those factors the changes in military spending as a percentage of
government expenditures were computed.
From the data in Table IV, the regression analysis gave the
scattergram shown in Figure 4, again government expenditures as the
independent variable and defense expenditures as a percentage of govern-
ment expenditures as the dependent variable. The dispersion of the
points in the scattergram and the value of r, which dropped from 0.95 to
-0.83, seems to indicate that the association existing in Figure 3 did
not hold where defense expenditures were measured as a share of govern-
ment expenditures. The correlation is probably overstated by the two
outliers at the lower right hand of the graph.
The conclusion to be drawn from the first analysis is that the
increase in government expenditures led to larger military expenditures
only in the absolute value of money and also that both variables
increased over time. According to the second analysis, changes in
budgetary policy regarding the size of military expenditures were not
substantial and decisively influential. The average military spending
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Figure 4. Scattergram of Defense
Expenditures as a percentage of Government
Expenditures, 1962-1975.
2. Economic Factors
The problem of national security might in theory be regarded as
one big economic problem. The nation has certain resources: land, labor,
and capital. These resources can be used to satisfy many objectives of
the nation and its citizens; national security, improving standard of
living, social security, economic growth, etc. These are, of course,
competing objectives [Ref. 20, p. 3]. National policy, being the apex
of the triangle to which economic policy, foreign policy and defense




It is also assumed that the state of a nation's economy has always
been a controlling factor in the size and shape of its Armed Forces.
O'Leary and Coplin included in their factors for analyzing the
patterns of Latin American military expenditures, the economic conditions
within the Latin American nations [Ref. 43, p. 114]. Schmitter found
strong evidence supporting the existence of a close association between
total economic resources and the level of domestic defense spending in
Latin America [Ref. 45, p. 151].
Thus, it becomes apparent from the above studies that countries
with less restrictive constraints in their economic output shall
allocate a substantial portion of it to defense expenditures.
Before depicting the simple regression analysis, it seems appropriate
to define the economic factors (constraints) influencing the nation's
military strength. The GDP concept is preferred over the other known
factor of national income, gross national product (GNP) . Both are
widely used, but perhaps the former, according to the literature, has
been more frequently used when Latin American economies are involved.
GDP seems to be more representative of the value of national production,
free of duplication, than GNP.
The model used in evaluating the relationship of government expendi-
tures and military expenditures is, again used with GDP and defense
expenditures. Here, an assumption that GDP and government expenditures
are not the same measure is necessary. Even, where a regression
analysis between the two variables, GDP vs government expenditures,
























7400 fi ll I I I I I L
1600 2880 4160 5440 6720 8000
2240 3520 4800 6080 7360
Government Expenditures
Figure 5. Scattergram of Gross Domestic Product by
Government Expenditures, 1962-1975
(In millions of 1970 dollars)
different factors. GDP as a measure of a nation economic output contains
such values as: exports, government consumption, private and public
investment and private consumption, while the government expenditures
is a measure of what the government (nationally) is expected to consume
during a time period and itself is part of the GDP.
It has been the author's intention to correlate under the foregoing




In the graph of Figure 6, the values of GDP (independent variable)
and defense expenditures (dependent variable) are plotted on the X and
Y axes respectively. The correlation between the variables is positive,
with a r of 0.98. From the figure it may be inferred that the increase
100
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Figure 6. Scattergram of Defense Expenditures by
Gross Domestic Product, 1962-1975.
(In millions of 1970 dollars)
of GDP, during the period, led to an increase of military spending in
dollar value. This positive relationship seems to be stronger, in
2
terms of r (0.96247 versus 0.90626) than the one of government
expenditures and defense expenditures.
According to the foregoing analysis, fluctuations in the national
economy have been a better determinant of absolute variations in defense
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spending than the national budget, even where both seemed to have a
similar constraining effect.
To complete the evaluation of relationship between GDP and military
spending, it is necessary to analyze the effect of the fluctuations in
the economy over the military requirements when the latter variable is
measured as a percentage of GDP.
In the scattergram of Figure 7 the X axis, again represents the
independent variable GDP and the Y axis represents defense expenditures
as a percentage of GDP. The graph indicates that both variables were
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Figure 7. Scattergram of Defense Expenditures: as a




independent. The sample correlation coefficient r is 0.0355 and the
value of the slope (B) 0.00.
It becomes apparent that the economic conditions of Venezuela
during the interval 1962-1975 did not have a significant influence over
the defense expenditures when the latter was defined as a share of
GDP, and thus taking into account other sectors at the national level.
Regarding the relationship of the economic factors with military
requirements, it becomes apparent, as it was expected, that increases
in the former sector corresponded with increases in the latter. There
is no indication that the share of defense spending out of GDP was
affected by the variations in the national economy. As an average,
the share was 1.54 percent.
a. The Oil-Producing Nations and Their Defense Expenditures
The oil price increase in 1973 had a tremendous impact on
the Venezuelan economy. The GDP increased from $ 15,373 million in
1973 to $ 23,574 million in 1974, a 53.4 percent increase.
The oil-producing nations, with sudden surpluses of foreign exchange,
did not behave in a similar fashion. Some Arab nations were spending
huge amounts of petrodollars in military hardware, each one under its
own national policy. An author said that the oil-producing nations
"...touched off a seemingly endless race to obtain the most sophisticated
armament available in the world." [Ref . 39, p. 5] Whether the statement
is applicable to all the OPEC nations is a question beyond the scope of
this thesis. Nevertheless, an illustration with available data of four
OPEC nations and two non-OPEC nations is provided below:
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Military Expenditures and GNP
for Six Selected Nations, 1975
In millions of 1974 dollars
Military Gross National Military Exp./
Country Expenditures Product (GNP) GNP
Brazil $2,230 $101,000 2.2%
Colombia 151 12,400 1.2
Ecuador* 68 3,650 1.9
Iran* 7,100 47,700 14.9
Saudi Arabia* 1,600 25,100 6.4
Venezuela* 493 27,300 1.8
*0PEC MEMBERS.
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [Ref. 61, pp. 22, 25,
27, 33, 45, and 52].
From the graph it is difficult to say, at least normatively this or
that nation was spending more resources in military hardware than it
should be. Each nation has its own national policy which is supposed
to be the core of the foreign policy, the economic policy and the
defense policy, established by its government.
In Venezuela's case, the Armed Forces because of the oil price
increase spend more resources in 1974 and 1975 than it had spent in the
period 1971-1973. It is very likely that part of those resources were
used to pay already committed funds under credit purchases and to





In 1977, Venezuela was one of the few civilian democracies
12
still existing in Latin America. Since 1959 , four civilians had
constitutionally been elected by the people.
Much of the literature about military spending and arms acquisition
in Latin America makes mention of military influence over the decision
makers in order to gain supporters and thus facilitate the acceptance
and approval of military requirements, particularly for arms procurement.
The reasons for that tendency may be, in the proliferation of military
governments and, when a civilian government exists, the general belief
that the civilian administration will please the military planners
with the sole purpose of keeping them out of politics [Ref. 32, p. 161].
There is no evidence that a strong military influence existed in
Venezuela during 1962-1975; O'Leary and Coplin in a study of the bix
six Latin American spenders, which included Venezuela, for 1960-1970,
found no consistent variations in military spending with different roles
of the military [Ref. 43, p. 121]. It is quite interesting, what another
author said in 1968, about the involvement of the Venezuelan military in
politics:
Today, the great majority of officers have realized
there is much to be gained, both individually and
institutionally, by moderation and obedience. Many
examples could be offered from the experience of the
last ten years that patient lobbying has produced
the same results as threat or golpe, in terms of
the advancement of military interests, and that it
has done so with less trauma and often with more
speed [Ref. 50, p. 70].
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After the fall of the military government in 1958, elections were




In 1976, the Venezuelan President pointed out that the Armed Forces
were an example of institution using stability, esprit de corps, and
disciplined behavior, to improve their activities, which are fundamental
for the nation [Ref. 29, p. 6].
Recently, there has been a trend towards the association of the
Armed Forces with national development. In the 1974 Budget Law under
the chapter corresponding to the Ministry of Defense, the Military
Engineering Service ( Servicio de Ingenieria Militar ) justified its
requirements for that year with the following statement:
Venezuela's development is a direct cause of the
Armed Institution's growing, which demands for
each final year greater budgetary resources.
Over the last years the Engineering Service besides
its specific functions has developed civic action
activities in fulfillment of goals previously
established by the Ministry of Defense [Ref. 67,
p. 35].
In 1975, the President noted that the Air Force was an example of
the Armed Forces' modernization. The Air Force's behavior he stated,
was projecting itself beyond its military duties to become a firm
supporter of the nation's integral development [Ref. 28, p. 69]. Thus,
it becomes apparent, that any military influence was due more to the
normally accepted lobbying and/or marketing through which the Ministry
of Defense and the respective services had to conduct if they wanted
to see their specific requirements.
Putting together pure missions and civic action functions seemed
to be an approach increasingly used to justify some programs. It was
particularly important at a time when the concept of intergral develop-
13
ment seemed to be adopted.
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The concept of integral development involved the active participation





Venezuela in the early 1960s, as it was cited in the preceding
chapter, had to deal with internal insurgency, coming from both military
dissidents and communist guerrillas, the latter being primarily motivated
by the Cuban government.
Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that military requirements and
arms acquisition from 1962 to 1968 should have reflected the existing
domestic situation in at least two major items:
(1) training of military personnel in-country and in foreign
nations, particularly the U.S., in counterinsurgency tactics; and
(2) procurement of arms with main or side application in permissive
counterinsurgency operations.
The first item will not be covered in this study. An attempt would
be made to depict the acquisition patterns of the second item.
Since an increase in defense expenditures would be expected under the
assumptions above made, a graphic illustration shall serve to point
that out. Figure 8 shows the trends in military spending for Venezuela
during the period 1962-1975. Drawing a divisory line through the year
1968 leaves, the left hand of the curve in Figure 8, as the zone
corresponding to the period of internal insurgency in Venezuela (1962-1968)
According to the graph defense expenditures increased from $106 million
in 1962 to $ 172 million in 1967. In 1968, military spending dropped to
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Figure 8. Trends In Defense Expenditures: Venezuela and Colombia,
1962-1975.
Internal insurgency in Venezuela.
Trends to external defense.
Source: See Table VI.
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According to secondary sources, Venezuela received in arms transfers
an estimated $ 41 -81 million for the 1962-1968 period, see data below:
Value of Arms Transfers to Venezuela, 1962-1975.
(In millions of 1970 dollars)
YEAR $ YEAR $ YEAR $
1962 5.1 1967 10.6 1972 59.1
1963 6.7 1968 3.2 1973 79.7
1964 5.5 1969 3.1 1974 68.5
1965 3.3 1970 3.0 1975 27.4
1966 7.4 1971 19.4 — —
Source: Figures converted to 1970 dollars from: (1) 1962-1964: U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [Ref. 60, p. A-8]; and (2) 1966-1975:
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [Ref. 61, p. 75].
Thus, out of $ 974 million corresponding to military outlays for the
period 1962-1968, an estimate $ 41.8 million went to arms procurement
representing a 4.3 percent of total aggregated defense expenditures for
the same period. The relatively small investment in military hardware
during a time of internal insurgency indicates that the increase in
military requirements was due more to other programs, such as: (1)
civic action; (2) constructions; (3) training; (4) salary increase; and
others.
The number of major weapons system transferred to Venezuela during
that period, was not an indication of any major build-up of inventories.
In terms of type of weapons during the 1960s, the emphasis was on
helicopters (29) light armored cars (15), trainer aircraft (12) light
bombers and reconnaisance aircraft (14), and combat aircraft (74 F86Ks,




Most of those systems were considered to fall into what has been
described as a most preferred category for permissive counterinsurgency
actions [Ref. 31, p. 319]. The Navy acquired its second ex-U.S. sub-
marine in 1965 while the remaining Navy transfers were of the auxiliary
type ships including some under loan agreement with the U.S. The Navy
mission was focused in protecting the Venezuelan coast against external
intrusion.
For the period 1969-1975, no discussion will be made about the
influence of internal insurgency over the military requirements, the
assumptions made earlier did not consider any significant internal
insurgency for that interval. The graph in Figure 8 shows a decrease
in military outlays in 1969 with a slightly increase in 1970. The increase
in military spending started in the early 1970s would be treated in the
next two sections.
4. External Factors
Venezuela and Colombia have frequently been cited as potential
14
arms rivals, although not the only rivals, in Latin America. One
study pointed that rivalry out by saying implicitly that "...the major
South American armed forces perceive possible external conflicts with
their neighbors, and seek some preparedness for conventional operations
along their national frontiers and in defense of territorial waters."
[Ref. 10, p. 27].
14
See Laurance, E. J., Arms Transfers and Influence in Latin America:
1961-1973
,
paper presented at International Studies Association, Annual
meeting, Toronto, February 25-29, 1976, and Weaver, J. L., "Arms
Transfers to Latin America: A Note on the Contagion Effect," Journal of
Peace Research , v. XI, No. 3, pp. 213-219, 1974.
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Terms such as: regional balance, arms race, and imitation are
among the most used to suggest the arms acquisition behavior of Latin
American countries.
The arms suppliers have perhaps been the most interested group in
the open discussion of subjective hypotheses concerning the arms
acquisition patterns of the Latin American nations. If the arms sellers'
interest is to sell weapons then, a productive approach (for them) would
be that of motivating arms acquisition through expressions such as
"...arms sellers are actually salesmen of security." [Ref. 40, p. 14]
Defenders of arms transfer say that the military balance in any
geographical area makes adventurism less likely. They maintain that
more wars would result if one nation were allowed to grow much more
powerful than its neighbors [Ref. 40, p. 17]. The latter hypothesis
is generally accepted as valid.
In 1975, Venezuela had not yet resolved boundary controversies
with two neighboring countries, Colombia and Guyana. No military
incident had been reported between Venezuela and its two neighbors.
Nevertheless, in the early 1970s national and international press were
openly speculating the controversial delimitation of maritime waters
of Venezuela and Colombia.
A visual representation, shown in Figure 8, of the defense
expenditures of both nations shall serve to illustrate how their trends
looked for the period 1962-1975. The first conclusion to be drawn from
the graph is that Venezuela spent more dollars in defense than Colombia
did, and second, while the difference of military spending was about
constant until 1972, it opened widely in 1973, the year in which
Venezuela increased its oil revenues. From there on it may be expected
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that the Venezuelan military expenditures would be greater than the
Colombian, as a result of greater resources.
In 1971 Venezuela and Colombia had a noticeable increase in military
outlays. Colombia had ordered two German submarines and 18 French
Mirage fighters to be paid over 9 to 10 years [Ref. 19, p. 25]. In
Venezuela, the increase was mainly because of the purchase of 16 0V-10
Bronco aircraft, 4 C-130 transports, and 12 Cessna 182 light transports.
If Venezuela in 1971, was influenced by the Colombian acquisition
of the Mirages then, a rational behavior would have been, to try to
balance that air power. By late 1971, Venezuela ordered 15 Mirages (III/5)
with delivery date for 1973-1974 [Ref. 37, p. 19]. This purchase was a
consequence of one or more of the following factors: (1) to balance the
Colombian air power; (2) to replace the old F-86K squadron; and (3)
regional air balance; in 1972 four of the Latin American big six had
supersonic fighters Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru.
The trend in defense expenditures observed from Figure 8 does not
indicate a reaction by Venezuela after the increases in the Colombia's
spending in 1968 and 1971. The military spending in Venezuela went down
until 1969 from a high peak in 1967 and also decreased in 1972 from a
high in 1971. From 1973 on the increases have corresponded to greater
available resources.
The remaining major military equipment acquired by Venezuela during
the period indicated as Zone II in Figure 8, was represented by:
medium tanks, self-propelled guns, trainer aircraft, intermediate fighters,
ex-U.S. destroyers, ex-U.S submarines, fast patrol boats, and ex-U.S.
transports.
Much of that hardware was suitable for either external defense or
internal security missions. The Navy was increasing its ASW and coastal
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patrol capabilities, while the Army and Air Force were renovating their
inventories. The aggregated expenditures in arms imports for the period
1969-1975 were in the order of $ 260 million. This amount represented
15.6 percent of total military outlays for the same period, and an
increase of 522 percent over the value of arms transfers between 1962
and 1968, see Table in page 54.
Based on internal and external factors (internal security and a
minimum deterence capability) Venezuela invested, in arms imports, an
estimated $ 302 million for the time period 1962-1975.
5. Logistic Factors
a. Technical Capability
Because of the existing international flow of weapons, the
less developed countries are able to afford types of armament which
they are unable to produce [Ref. 27, p. 94],
Venezuela is one of those nations. Its ample national resources
have facilitated the procurement of modern and intermediate conventional
weapons, thus responding to the Armed Forces' needs. At the same time
the Venezuelan Armed Forces have been developing rigorous training
programs to adapt to the complex technology that normally accompany
those systems.
The Ministry of Defense and the military services have emphazised
and have given priority to personnel development. The implementation
of that policy has been carried out in service schools, particularly for
petty officers and enlisted personnel, and postgraduate schools. In
1973, a common postgraduate institute was created and is under the
jurisdiction of the Minister of Defense thus, grouping already existing
schools of the Navy and Army.
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Personnel development in the Armed Forces has been an important
aspect of the logistic support of modern military equipment. This is
particularly crucial when the user of that equipment is a nation that
imports all of its major military equipment.
The acquisition of a new weapon usually requires training a group
of people in order to acquire the skills to operate and maintain, up
to certain levels, the system. To keep a major weapon in operational
condition is expensive and absorbs a large quantity of skilled manpower.
The personal contact of the Venezuelan military personnel with foreign
military schools particularly in the U.S., and at the factories of
the foreign suppliers is being developed as a valuable technical asset.
Thus, trained personnel capable of carrying on the technical operations
which are called for, become part of the process or system which is
being transferred. This may come to constitute the creation of human
capital, the knowledge embodied in the people.
The demand for modern weapons seems to be related to a sense of
technical capability within the Armed Forces. Since the early 1950s
the Venezuelan Armed Forces have been advancing in levels of sophistica-
tion applied to its arms procurement. In little more than 20 years
(1950-1975) the military services have come through several generations
of weapons systems.
In 1975, each service possessed, at least, one weapon representative
of one of the last generation of medium price items e.g., Mirages III/5
(fighter and trainer); AMX-30/155 (armored fighting vehicles and
howitzers); and fast patrol boats armed with Otomat missiles. In 1975,
the Navy ordered six frigates to be built in Italy armed with Otomat
missiles [Ref. 54, p. 96] and in 1973 ordered two new conventional




Even, when the Venezuelan Armed Forces in 1975 possessed
some modern and relatively new weapon systems it also had in its
inventory materiel which was already obsolete. The services, trying
to do the best with the available resources, normally operated and
maintained their inventories to the latest possible time.
The attempts to maintain, or just keep in an acceptable state of
readiness, obsolescent weapons, created economic and logistic constraints.
The possession of military hardware already discontinued by the original
manufacturer or phased out by the foreign military service, in cases of
used material, and whose life cycle has been prolonged more than the
expected economic life, has frequently been a burden for the Armed
Forces.
If, to the burden of obsolescence, one adds the lack of standardi-
zation or the extensive diversification in designs of weapons destined
for the same purpose, and the requirement for different types of spares,
and ammunition, then the economic and logistics problems simply multiply.
The high costs and logistics constraints of operating obsolescent
equipment and at the same time the high costs for highly sophisticated
new weapons have motivated two kinds of military planning: (1) to
prolong, with the available resources, the life of the existing hardware;
and (2) to replace aging and obsolete materiel by medium price weapons
and of appropriate military value.
As for instance, during the period 1962-1975 the Navy implemented
two replacement decision, 6 new fast patrol boats and 2 new submarines
were to gradually replace the old ex-U.S. patrol boats and submarines.
In 1975 the Navy had initiated the replacement of the 1950s English

and Italian destroyers with an order for production of 6 frigates to
Italian shipbuilders.
Technical capability of the military personnel and generational
obsolescence were considered to be the most relevant logistic factors
influencing the military requirements in the period 1962-1975.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
An overview of the composition of the military establishment in
Venezuela in 1975, indicates the presence of weapons that had been
transferred into the respective service during the period 1950-1961.
Also, it is noticeable the presence of modern intermediate weapons
and some advanced ones as well. This mixture of weapons, not only
in their generation but also in their source suggest the kind of
problems a nation that imports all of its arms must confront and solve
if it wants to keep its military forces at an acceptable level of
readiness.
According to the regression analyses, both GDP and government
expenditures were positively associated with the size of the defense
budget. Where GDP and government receipts were expanding, expansions
in the allocations for defense expenditures and arms procurement also
occurred. The same reasoning did not hold where the military spending
was analyzed as a share of GDP and of government expenditures. The
low key figures representing the averages of the latter association as
well as the total aggregated value of arms transfers during the interven-
ing period, do not show that the acquisition of new or used weapons was
detrimental to the growth of the civilian economy.
The availability of greater resources beyond 1973 had facilitated
the replacement of aging and obsolescent military hardware, particularly
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within the Navy. Nevertheless, it becomes apparent that Venezuela was
not engaged in any arms inventory build up, other than replacing old
materiel once more resources became available to the nation and in turn
to the Armed Forces.
That pattern in arms acquisition was consistent with the foreign
policy of arms control, which Venezuela was promoting, without debilitat-
ing the national defense position.
There was not strong evidence that Venezuela, during the period
1962-1975, designed its arms acquisition programs after the arms
transfers' pattern of regional or neighboring nations. While the
Mirages acquisition seems to negate the foregoing statement, the purchase
of the same supersonic fighter (same brand name) might be, more of a
consequence of availability of suppliers willing to sell that kind of
weapon, than an imitative behavior.
Perhaps, the most influential factors in the demands for arms were
the logistic factors. The increasing technical capability and pro-
fessionalism of the military encouraged the procurement of modern,
prestigious and advanced weapons which were supposed to replace the old
materiel kept in inventory for more than two decades. Finally, while
some of these factors facilitated the purchases from the international




V. THE SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS
AND THE ARMS SUPPLIERS
The arms supply business is fraught with ideology, concepts of
political influence, debates over militarism, and commercial pressures
[Ref. 10, p. 45]. At least, that is what it seems to be according to
the available literature about the international arms trade.
There are a number of different policies which govern the supply
of weapons from different countries. Each policy represents a varying
mix of rationales, a mix which reflects the position of the supplying
nation in the international system [Ref. 46, p. 17]. For instance, a
political rationale may be behind the policy of the U.S. when it
supplies sophisticated conventional weapons to less developed nations
in the Middle East (e.g., Iran and Saudi Arabia), and at the same time
limits the access of certain intermediate arms to Latin American nations.
Each arms supplier has its own policy, whether it is based on
political, economical, or ideological considerations. At times, that
policy may be related to collective restrictive measures (embargos)
agreed upon in international organizations or even to informal under-
standings among supplier countries.
Therefore, the arms supply rationale is going to have some impact
on the source selection policy (formal or informal) adopted by the buyer
or recipient. Because of that, it becomes apparent that nations like
Venezuela, with almost no indigenous production of military hardware
and therefore dependent on foreign suppliers to satisfy its defense
requirements, need to have a firm and formal source selection policy.
A firm source selection policy shall strengthen the negotiation position

of the arms recipient with the arms suppliers. Venezuela has, since
1975, formalized its policy concerning the acquisition of weapons systems
and major military equipment.
A. THE SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS
Source selection is defined as "the process wherein the requirements,
facts, recommendations, and government policy relevant to an award
decision in a competitive procurement of a system are examined and the
decision is made." [Ref. 7, p. 259]
The 1975' s Ministry of Defense regulations for the source selection
process of weapons system, requires that in order to select a contractor,
the buying military service shall make formal evaluations of the pro-
posals in the following areas: operational, technical, and financial.
Evaluations of proposed weapons system are made by three separate
Evaluation Committees named by the Commanding General of the Service.
The committee members, both, civilian and military officials, are from
the functional organizations involved in procuring the weapon system.
Each evaluation is given numeric factors according to a set of
criteria established by the committees before the offers (proposals) are
called for. The Financial Committee prepares a final report in coordi-
nation with the other two committees. The final report is made in terms
of cost-effectiveness for each alternative and presented to the Commanding
General of the Service.
The Commanding General of the Service, involved in the acquisition
program, is the authority responsible for the decision over the selection
of the proposal [Ref. 4, p. 182]. Nevertheless, he needs the approval of
the Superior Junta of the Armed Forces [Ref. 4, p. 47] and, of the
President of the Republic when it is believed that the program has economic

or political implications. If any controversy over the selection of a
weapon system arise, at the decision stage of the source selection
process, the President is invested to take a final decision [Ref. 4,
P- 35].
A negotiation process begins, after the potential source is
selected, between the buying service and the contractor. This process
finishes when a contract, legally binding on both parties, is accorded.
A third government organization enters the negotiation process with
particular interest in the financial arrangements. Representatives of
the Ministry of the Treasury are present at the time the terms of the
contract are discussed. Also, as was mentioned earlier, Congress must
approve any allocation of funds or agreements which effect the national
treasury in future fiscal years.
The type of military procurement in which the Armed Forces are most
involved, is the denominated "production program." This category of
procurement corresponds to items or systems already developed by the
industrialized nations but not available in stock. It is assumed the
arms industry do not produce major items for exports without purchasing
orders. The higher costs required in the production of a weapon system
represent too much risk for a firm to manufacture it with no customers.
This is one of the major differences with the commercial world, besides
the source selection procedure itself.
1. Solicitation of Offers
The administrative office in charge of screening potential
contractors is normally one concerned with the logistics support, at
headquarters level, within the buying service. The officials involved
in this stage of the source selection may or may not be members of the
Evaluation Committees.

The screening of contractors is made before the offers are solicited
from the contractors whose participation has been approved. It is the
Ministry of Defense policy to call for (arms acquisition) the most
number of contractors (firms) that are considered "responsible" ( aptos )
that is, capable of fulfilling the terms of the proposed procurement
contract. This policy presumes, under such screening, that those
contractors who constitute themselves just for occasional business and
those who have failed in past performances, would not be present at the
final list.




(c) experience in producing the type of weapon to be procured;
(d) quality of work;
(e) past performances;
(f) qualitative and quantitative availability of human resources;
(g) labor-management relationship;
(h) market stability;
(i) cooperation with the customer; and
(j) political conditions at the home-based nation.
The Commanding General of the Service approves the final list of
contractors to whom official solicitations are issued. The solicitation
contains basic information related to the operational and logistics
specifications of the weapon system to be acquired and, based on the
theoretical model approved by the Commanding General of the Service.
The degree of accuracy and comprehensive or detailed definition of the
equipment required is quite significant when dealing with arms suppliers.

Besides the basic information mentioned above the solicitation
contains:
(1) the pre-definition of contract;
(2) set of criteria to be used for the evaluation of the proposals
and their relative importance, in general terms; and
(3) other administrative data.
Because Venezuela relies heavily on foreign military technology it
utilizes its embassies (military attache) in the procurement process.
Also, solicitation of offers may be requested through foreign firm
representatives in Venezuela and foreign embassies in Venezuela. In
the latter case, the marketing strategy of the arms seller may play an
important role in divulging the available military technology.
When the offers are received, they are taken into consideration by
the Commanding General of the Service for a preliminary analysis and a
first decision stage: to continue with the evaluation or to re-
formulate the solicitation of offers.
Thus, it becomes apparent that the Venezuelan Government wants more
competition at the time of acquiring new weapons not only to have more
alternatives to compare but also to have more opportunity to negotiate
reasonable deals for the national treasury. Of course, it may happen
that where no competition exists the contract negotiations are made on
a sole-source basis.
2. A Comparison with the United States Model
The source selection model adopted by the Venezuelan Armed
Forces is similar, to some extent, to the model used by the U.S. Armed
Forces. The latter is described by Fox [Ref. 7, pp. 259-285].
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The extent of similarity, the author wishes to highlight, refers
to the rationality of the whole arms acquisition process which is the
goal of the Venezuelan military decision-makers. The adoption of a
rational policy for the source selection process that complements the
first two stages of the arms acquisition process, the needs for arms
and the determination of requirements, give the Venezuelan Government
some kind of shelter against the diverse policies and interests existing
in the international arms trade and obviously a sound decision-making
process.
Both models, the U.S. and the Venezuela's, implicitly have as
a main objective the acquisition of the desired system under reasonable
terms for the government. Also a desire for including more people within
the decision process motivates the specific procedures.
WTiile most Venezuela's arms acquisitions are of the production
program type, in the U.S. the source selection is well used for both
programs, development and production procurements. This is a natural
consequence of being a world power and because of the characteristics
of the U.S. arms industry.
One last observation on the Venezuelan model as compared to the
U.S. model, is that the former does not include a weighting criteria for
the three areas of evaluation, that means the relative importance of one
area over the others (e.g., technical: 50%; operation: 30%; and
financial: 20%).
B. THE ARMS SUPPLIERS: A BACKGROUND
As it was said earlier, the arms suppliers policies may have some
kind of influence upon the arms recipient policy. This influence may
last as long as and until, (not in all cases) the arms recipient does

not have a self-sufficient domestic military production. Even in this
case, the industrialized nations have control upon the production
equipment, which sometimes is more expensive than the weapon itself.
They have also the right to license the technology to whoever they
wish to and under conditions which may require more than the recipient
is willing to give such as excessive royalties and economic concessions.
In the early part of the century, the international arms trade was
principally in the hands of private manufacturers and dealers. The
degree of governmental interest in this business has subsequently
increased very sharply. Today virtually all conventional arms transfers
are transacted on a government-to-government basis or are otherwise
controlled by the governments of supplier and recipient nations [Ref. 60,
p. 25].
Governmental controls over arms transfers vary widely from country
to country. All governments impose some control and all military
exports require government permission. Not only do governments generally
control the defense industry, either through ownership or by virtue of
their monopsonistic position, but they also bear a large share of the
responsibility for organizing and promoting the exports of arms [Ref. 46,
p. 4].
In 1975 the two major arms suppliers were U.S. and the Soviet Union
with both having a share of 76.6 percent of world total arms transfers
for that year. The U.S. being the leader with 49.8 percent of the
world total.
Over the time period 1966-1975 a noticeable expansion in arms
exports has been observed by some suppliers nations (non-communist)
other than the U.S. and the Soviet Union; Italy: 20 percent; France:
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18 percent; United Kingdom: 15 percent; and the Federal Republic of
Germany: 10 percent. For the same period, France was the third large
arms exporter, after U.S. and the Soviet Union, with $ 3.2 billion
[Ref. 61, p. 63].
On a broader scale the international resurgence of economic and
political multipolarity has naturally stimulated the shifts in the
supply and demand patterns [Ref. 10, p. 22]. For the developing nations,
particularly Venezuela, it has been accompanied by the resurgence of
more alternatives for the arms trade.
C. THE ARMS ACQUISITION PATTERNS: 1962-1975
1. Domestic Military Production
Venezuela relies heavily on foreign sources to satisfy its needs
for arms and military equipment. Its indigenous military production
has been limited to ammunition for small arms, production barely enough
to satisfy internal demands.
In 1976, Venezuela began a first step in the attempts to
develop a small domestic military industry. A recently created autonomous
agency, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense (Compania
Anonima Venezolana de Industrias Militares) received $ 5 million of a
estimated total of $ 42 million to be allocated to the agency in three
years. The short-range objectives of the agency are as follows:
(1) to satisfy the national demand of ammunition calibers
7.62 mm , and 9 mm
.
(2) to develop the production of powder needed for the
ammunitions domestically produced.
(3) to promote national production of material related to
the military industry [Ref. 74, p. V-E-9].
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Besides this decision of getting into the ammunition and explosives
business, it is very likely that Venezuela will enter into coproduction
of helicopters with an Italian manufacturer through the government
agency responsible of promoting the aeronautic industry. Also,
coproduction ventures with Italy may be expected to occur in small
naval constructions. No major coproduction deals are expected within
the domestic arms industry.
It is clear that for the government, other sectors have higher
priorities and that the efforts to develop a "real" arms industry shall
wait for better times.
To develop a valuable arms industry requires enormous initial
investment, availability of highly trained human resources, and
existence of an able industry related to the military (e.g., electronics)
Even having those resources the production costs when, only limited
demands exists, may be prohibitive for an industry that requires
economics of scale. The government, therefore, is taking a rational
and conscious approach on the question of domestic military production.
2. Arms Imports Trend
Venezuela, since the early 20th century, has kept amicable
foreign relations with the free industrialized world. This policy has
permitted valuable foreign inputs for the nation's military sector,
which substitutes for the lack of domestic military production.
Thus, by means of international trade, Venezuela has gained
access to foreign military technology through the import of weapons.
Similarly, Venezuela has received technical assistance from abroad
which has meant new valuable administrative skills for the national
military e.g., by means of: U.S. military advisers; military overseas
training not only in the U.S. but also in Europe and South America.
71

Technological, administrative and economic resources imported
from abroad are not, of course, strictly part of a nation's military
potential. But they add to its military strength, and the ability to
get such resources from abroad may be regarded as part of a nation's
potential [Ref. 27, p. 31].
Venezuela's trend in arms imports for the period 1962-1975













1962 63 64 74 75
Figure 9. Venezuela: Trends in arms imports, 1962-1975
Source: Figures converted to 1970 dollars from: (1) 1962-1964:
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [Ref. 60, p. A-8]; and
(2) 1966-1975: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [Ref. 61,
p. 75].
The low key values up to the late 1960s correspond to the period
of internal insurgency activities. Therefore, a trend to acquire
internal security related weapons, which are of low monetary cost per
unit, was expected for the period 1962-1968. On the other hand after
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the year 1970 a sharply increase, 2,556 percent between 1970 and 1973,
in arms imports reflects the trend towards the purchasing of external
defense related weapons which are of high cost values per unit.
The high jump in dollars of arms imports between 1971 and 1975 also
reflects a replacement pattern, particularly when the description of
the material is taken into account. The high-priced items transferred
to Venezuela after 1970 were represented by: (1) AMX-30 tanks;
(2) AMX-155 howitzers; (3) Mirage fighters; (4) fast patrol boats
with Otomat missiles and (5) CF-5 fighters.
Around the 1980s it is reasonable to expect a decrease in the
monetary value of the arms imports to Venezuela. More defense expen-
ditures are expected in maintenance and overhauling of the existing
inventory.
Even though some purchases for the period 1962-1975 cover used
and surplus materiel e.g., F-86K fighters, some Canberra bombers, and
particularly ex-U.S. naval vessels, the general trend has been toward
the acquisition of new arms. The Navy had started to renovate its old
inventory with new patrol boats from the United Kingdom, with conven-
tional submarines from West Germany, and lately with frigates from Italy.
The Air Force, the other service with relatively recent acquisition
of used materiel, F-86Ks, also followed the same trend of renovating its
squadron of fighters.
a. A Multiple Source Pattern
Another significant characteristic of Venezuela's arms
imports is, as it is shown in Table VII, page 98 , its diversification
of sources.
Between 1962 and 1975, six major arms manufacturers transferred
their products to Venezuela. Therefore the Venezuelan Armed Forces

inventory consists primarily of weapons with dissimilar sources. The
arms may sometimes have similar purposes and design, as for instance
fighters from France and Canada and destroyers and frigates from the
U.S., Italy and the United Kingdom. A good point for the fighters is
that they can use the U.S. Sidewinder missile.
The question of diversification reaches major levels when the
logistics factors are taken into account. Managing thousands of
spares, hundreds of parts, and hundreds of components with different
specifications, manufacturers, etc., requires the existence of a very
effective supply system. This logistic factor has been a limiting
constraint, particularly within the Navy. A lack of standardization
is a challenge that deserves a great amount of effort on the part of
the Navy Command. Particularly important at times when modern and
more sophisticated ships are being integrated into the fleet.
The logistics support becomes a very constraining factor for many
years after receiving the new ship. For by that time the manufacturer
or manufacturers of components integrating the ship usually have closed
the production lines of those products. To keep the production lines
opened the manufacturer depends, in most cases, on orders from its own
Navy or military service plus foreign orders. Since, normally, the
supplier's military structure phases its models or designs out faster
than the recipient the manufacturer simply shuts uneconomic operations
down. The start-up costs to reopen a closed production line, whether
to build or produce repair parts, can be a burden for the recipient's
budget.
These logistics constraints occur not only with new units as it was
described above but also with old materiel already used by the supplier's
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military force. For example, when Venezuela in the early 1970s, bought
two 1945 ex-U.S. destroyers at prices relatively inexpensive (one DD's
cost: $ 229,500) [Ref. 47, p. 123], it seemed to be a very good deal.
Nevertheless, in less than three years both ships were being refitted
in U.S. commercial shipyards, therefore raising the costs of the
destroyers and at the same time pouring money into the U.S. shipyards.
Looking at the problem of diversification of arms suppliers from
the view of a recipient nation, the lack of a domestic military industry
might have advantages and disadvantages when relying on either sole or
multiple source.
A sole source means a better integrative logistics support not only
for spares and ammunition but for maintenance, overhauling and training
(military reasons) . An easily integrated defense structure may be
accomplished under a sole source reliance. In turn a stronger relation-
ship is expected to be originated between the recipient and the supplier,
particularly important if both nations share similar political orienta-
tions and responsibilities in an international defense treaty.
The main disadvantage in relying on a sole supplier is dependence.
This dependence may be relevant when the political system of either
supplier or recipient changes, commonly the latter. The possibility of
embargo and/or refraining the flow of spares and ammunition may over-
shadow their relationship and create discomfort on the recipient's
military organization.
When the recipient's reliance is on multiple source there are the
advantages of competition, which in turn may give better deals for the
recipient (a purely economic reason) and less dependence from a par-




Logically, the disadvantages of diversification of sources are
mainly logistics (military reasons) . The logistics disadvantages of
a multiple source pattern may also be a burden not only for the defense
budget but for the readiness of the services.
Venezuela, as a recipient nation relying on multiple sources for
its arms needs, falls within the last group discussed above. Neverthe-
less, a sole source pattern seems to be followed by the Army which has
been consistent in the acquisition of French armored fighting vehicles
since 1954 (AMX's series). The Air Force and the Navy, have still
continued to rely on more than one source for replacing and re-equipping
their inventories.
For a nation determined to have a military establishment but depend-
ent on a foreign suppliers for its defense requirements the question of
"where to buy" becomes very complex. This problem diminishes when
resources are available and even so, it keeps relying on the suppliers
willing to sell weapons designed to the recipient needs and not to the
suppliers needs, and more important, in having a steady logistics support,
3. Venezuela's Arms Suppliers
Traditionally, Venezuela has imported the military hardware it
requires rather than meet its requirement for defense equipment from
internal sources. As it was treated earlier the Venezuelan military
manufacturing has so far concentrated on the small caliber ammunition
and explosives, mainly for internal consumption.
Table VIII, page 99 pictures the monetary value and percentages
of arms imports, by suppliers, for the period 1962-1975. According to
the table Venezuela's major suppliers for the period 1962-1975 were:
France, U.S., U.K., Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The
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suppliers whose participation in total transfers was not large enough
to be included within the major suppliers appear under the heading of
Others. It is very likely that among the smaller suppliers were Italy
(Otomat missiles and Oto/Melara guns), Belgium (small arms), Israel
(small arms) , and Sweden (anti-air guns)
.
From Tables VII and VIII it can be inferred that Venezuela during
the intervening period relied, for specific weapons system, on
European suppliers.
Assuming the "Others" suppliers are constituted of European nations
(non-communist countries) , Europe as a whole had a participation of
57 percent in the total value of arms transfers to Venezuela for the
period 1962-1975. In dollar value, this percentage meant approximately
$ 199 million worth of military sales, compared to $ 111 million for
U.S. France, for the period 1962-1975, became the leader in arms
exports to Venezuela, with a cumulative total of $ 131 million, with
U.S. in a second position.
Assuming the existence of interaction between the supplier's policy
and the arms recipient's policy no arms transfer analysis will be
completed if no consideration is made of the suppliers rationale,
a. The United States Policy
The United States is perhaps one of the few arms exporters,
free world, whose policy is primarily political. This means that the
United States considers the arms transfer a special extension of a
network of political relationships. For that reason the U.S. government
is deeply involved in any international arms transaction. So deeply
involved, that the bureaucratic government machinery makes what it seems
to be an easy transaction a lengthy and discouraging, for the customer,
process.

More recently, it has been mentioned that economic reasons are also
influencing U.S. sales agreements. It is said that arms sales reduce
the nation's own defense costs. Foreign orders mean bigger production
runs for arms manufacturers which in turn make each plane or tank rolling
off the assembly line a little cheaper [Ref. 2, p. 42]. For example in
1974 it was estimated that the F-14 sales to Iran would reduce the cost
of the total F-14 program by $ 60.8 million [Ref. 6, p. 1].
At the same time foreign orders may help to keep production lines
open thus keeping people employed. One former Secretary of defense
pointed out that 100 jobs in American industry are sustained for each
million dollars in foreign military sales [Ref. 40, p. 19].
While economic reasons along with the politics might be behind huge
sales to European and Middle East nations, OPEC members, it is not the
same when military sales to Latin America are involved.
The U.S. rationale, concerning arms supplies to Latin America, as
a whole region has been termed as a unilateral sales policy, paternal-
istic in the extreme.
Out of a world total arms transfers estimated in $ 34,923 million
during the period 1966-1975, United States exported to Latin America
only $ 883 million (a 2.5 percent). Two hypothesis can be inferred from
these figures: (1) that Latin America, in the arms trade, does not
represent substantial business for the U.S.; and (2) that Latin
America can not get the items of war it wishes from the U.S. market and
therefore goes to other markets, which means that U.S. applies a
political policy towards its arms trade with Latin America.
Though a few million of dollars may represent a useful sale for
medium size firms like Cessna Aircraft, Rockwell International, or Bell
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Helicopter (the major U.S. commercial arms sellers to Venezuela for the
period 1962-1975), it is accepted that U.S. has applied a political
rationale to its arms transfer trade with Venezuela (hypothesis 2)
.
The United States sees itself as the defender of the Americas against
external agression, primarily communist agression, in fulfillment of the
Rio Treaty. Thus, the U.S. does not justify large defense expenditures
in sophisticated and unneccessary weapons, prestigue items , where
those monies could be used for better purposes in the less developed
Latin America.
Following its commitment towards not selling highly technological
weapons to Latin America the U.S. Government has permitted commercial
sales to Venezuela of items such as helicopters, light and medium
trainers, transports, utility aircraft, counter- insurgency aircraft
and other minor equipment.
For the years 1962-1975 the Venezuelan Navy was the service that
received most ex-U.S. weapons, represented by Second World War destroyers
and submarines, refitted ASW aircraft, and some auxiliary vessels. The
latter equipment was transferred to the Venezuelan Navy on loan
agreements.
Venezuela, since 1950, has been able to import arms from U.S. under
the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program using both credit and cash type
of payment.
Under the credit program the Venezuelan Armed Forces have received
in military equipment, mainly utility equipment and excluding ammunition
and explosives, about $ 115 million from 1955 to 1975 [Ref. 62, p. 11].
The credit agreements are normally financed directly by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) or in very few cases through the Export/ Import
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Bank with DOD guarantee. The latter case is unusual because the Export/
Import Bank credits are available only to industrial nations [Ref. 65,
p. 6]. For example the last credit agreement using the Export/Import
Bank credit was in 1966 for a value of $ 8.8 million with DOD guarantee
[Ref. 63, p. 13].
The United States credit program has been well received by the
Venezuelan Armed Forces. It usually allows the acquisition of military
equipment needed by the services available in U.S. The annual average
credit available to Venezuela under the program has been $ 7.5 million.
Since the annual credit agreement is funded under a separate
chapter in Venezuela's Defense budget, the military services do not
have to carry the burden of the payment on their specific budget. It
is expected by the Venezuelan military that the U.S. Foreign Military
Sales Credit Program be available in future years since it has repre-
sented an useful tool for the logistics support of the Armed Forces.
The United States Foreign Military Sales Agreements Program (cash
sales) with Venezuela for the years 1950-1975 have reached $ 226.9
million of which $ 165.5 million had actually been delivered [Ref. 62,
p. 15]. The difference may correspond to orders cancelled, material
pending for delivery or final cost of some Letter of Offers less than
the initial estimated.
Also, Venezuela uses commercial channels for major arms imports
from U.S. which of course have to be authorized by the U.S. Government.
This type of purchasing primarily has been utilized by the Venezuelan
Air Force, because of the availability of materiel which do not face
restrictions from the U.S. Government. During the period 1960-1975
an estimated of $ 49.5 million worth of arms were transferred to
Venezuela by means of commerical channels [Ref. 62, p. 17].
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Venezuela, does not appear as a recipient of arms transfer under
the U.S. Military Assistance Program. This program has however, been
useful to the Venezuelan military as a source of training aid. During
the period 1950-1975 a total of 5,378 Venezuelan military students
received training in U.S. military schools. Expenditures for the
training, $ 13.3 million, were founded by U.S. through the International
Military Education and Training Program. Nevertheless, the U.S. has
been reducing the funds allocated for training assistance to Venezuela,
from $ 1.0 million in 1967 to $ 699,000 in 1975, and for the fiscal
year 1978 President Carter has requested to Congress $ 100,000 as a
military training assistance to the Venezuelan Armed Forces.
The drastic reduction in the Education and Training Program spon-
sored by the U.S. has resulted in a reduction of Venezuelan military
personnel attending U.S. military schools. Nevertheless, there are
students receiving postgraduate education and professional military
training in the U.S. whose expenditures are being funded by Venezuela,
through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program.
With all its pros and cons the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program
is regarded as worthy for certain purchases requiring administrative and
technical skills, scarce in Venezuela but available in the U.S. military
structure. The guarantee of buying military equipment with U.S. military
specifications is another well appreciated advantage of going through
that program.
It is very likely that Venezuela will continue to rely on U.S. as
the best source for new light and medium aircraft, as long as their price
is competitive with the European suppliers, particularly France and
Italy. As a source of more advanced weapons, intermediate fighters
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(e.g., the F-5E International Fighter), naval vessels, and tanks it is
difficult to predict a certain procurement pattern since it depends more
on U.S. politics and, by what it is seeing with President Carter's
policy the uncertainty is much greater,
b. The European Policy
Venezuela has had strong trade ties with most European
countries, especially those in the Common Market.
In the arms business, Venezuela has, since the 1950s kept an
amicable customer-supplier relationship, primarily with the United
Kingdom, Italy and France. These three countries were the first
suppliers of new major military equipment to the Venezuelan Armed
Forces (naval vessels, aircraft, and tanks).
The literature frequently refers to the European policy in
the international arms trade as been purely economic although certain
countries may also have political rationales. Strong reasons seem to
support this behavior. The European arms industry operates within an
economics of scale more constrained than that of the U.S.; the former,
in order to survive, needs not only orders from their national military
organizations which are much smaller than the U.S., but also from
abroad.
Orders from abroad help to operate the industry's production
lines, within acceptable profits. For example, France had exported, as
of January, 1976, 161 Mirages out of 277 produced by that date [Ref . 38,
p. 36]. France seemed to be the most active in marketing its Dassault
Mirages in South America although Sweden and the United Kingdom tried
also to sell the Saab J35 Draken and the Hawker Hunter respectively
[Ref. 65, p. 10].
82

All European arms producers have government control of their arms
exports but the involvement of the government seems to be more oriented
towards facilitating the firms, of which many are owned by the state,
through promoting the export of their products. This government-
industry relationship reduces bureaucratic barriers which in turn gives
the potential customer the kind of assurance that his requirements will
be promptly processed.
Competitively, the European suppliers seem to have an advantage over
the U.S. First of all, the major European suppliers try to design the
weapons' specifications to fit not only their own military needs but
their customers' needs, particularly the less developed nations'. This
kind of policy, of producing weapons suitable for export, has won
Europe Latin American customers who have not been able to fill their
military requirements in the first instance from the region's natural
supplier, the U.S.
For example, the commercial dynamism of the French Government organi-
zation in charge of assuring a competivitve military-industrial complex
has allowed the French arms exports to triple in the 1970s [Ref. 44,
p. 7]. As of 1973 France has sold $200 million worth of Mirage fighters
in Latin America [Ref. 79, p. 138].
Since 1954 the Venezuelan Army has relied for its armored fighting
vehicles supplies on France (AMX's series). In the mid 1960s France
won its first Venezuelan contract for aircraft (helicopters) and in
1973 when the Air Force decided to enter the supersonic era, it also
was awarded the production of fighters.
The United Kingdom has for the period 1962-1975 continued to be a
supplier of light bombers and trainers to the Venezuelan Air Force.
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Nevertheless its future sales in this field is dubious since the Canberra
is beginning to lose its attractiveness in the light and medium bomber
line.
The long experience in the construction of patrol boats has allowed
the United Kingdom to win an order for six fast patrol boats in the
early 1970s from the Venezuelan Navy. This deal shall permit the
British industry to continue the supplier-recipient relationship with
the Venezuelan navy started in the early 1950s.
The gradual removal of the Federal Republic of Germany's strict,
self-imposed arms export restrictions has resulted in the export of
defense equipment to Latin America. In naval construction the Federal
Republic of Germany is limited to 1,000 ton vessels. Nevertheless, it
seems that the German submarine 209 class (1,000 tons) is gaining
acceptance as a true ocean going vessel [Ref. 13, p. 5]. Since U.S.
no longer builds conventional submarines and their sales are limited
to aged diesel hulls to those who need them, the Latin American
nations are turning to European suppliers particularly the Federal
Republic of Germany. Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Argentina, and Venezuela
have already ordered 209 class submarines.
Like other European countries, Italy's arms export policy results
from its military procurement policy which, in turn, has determined the
nature of its domestic defense industry. Its arms are primarily sold
on a commerical basis. The Italian Naval Attaches are very active in
promoting their products. Italy has successfully marketed some products
in Venezuela, particularly from the naval industry. In 1975, Italy won
the largest contract Venezuela has ever awareded to a foreign arms
industry, $ 507 million. Six (Lupo class) frigates, to be armed with
Otomat missiles were ordered by the Venezuelan Government.
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The commercial policies of the major European arms suppliers have
allowed them to compete successfully for that portion of Venezuela's
arms requirements which have not been fulfilled by the nation's natural
supplier, the U.S. The continuation of this trend is obviously
uncertain because of the many factors influencing the arms acquisition
process.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Venezuela learns most about how to deal with foreign arms suppliers
at the time of discussing contract terms for arms procurement. The
increasing volume of money spent in arms acquisition requires an
institutional mechanism which allowes the military services a more
stringent and rational method to evaluate and select potential contrac-
tors. Availability of technically able personnel, although limited,
and the experienced acquired in dealing with the arms industry since
the acquisition of new weapons in the 1950s have allowed new procedures
to be applied in the source selection process.
Whether a selection of a weapons system is made by considering
political or economic factors with higher priority than military factors
is a question of judgement. But what is really important is applying a
rational approach at the initial stage of any arms acquisition project.
The Venezuelan Armed Forces are at a mature stage in the complex process
of major arms procurement programs.
The 1970s are witnessing a variety of industrialized nations eager
for entering the international arms business. Different rationales are
being adopted by old and new arms suppliers.
United States, the world's leading arms supplier and the champion
of the political rationale in its arms exports policies seems lately to
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be attracted by commercial purposes. Although, secondary, the U.S. is
showing certain interest in arms deals which may act as economic impulses
for certain segments of its arms industry.
Nevertheless, U.S. has shown a persistent and consistent policy in
its arms business with Latin America and in turn with Venezuela. A
political motive is clearly defined when U.S. limits the flow of
intermediate new weapons to the Venezuelan market. The U.S. continues
with its policy that the less developed Latin America should put the
money it spends on unnecessary weapons to better uses.
At the same time U.S. does not consider the possibility of creating
imbalances in the supply of arms to neighboring countries e.g.,
Venezuela and Colombia.
European arms producers are pushing their products towards Latin
America and Venezuela already is a valuable customer. The U.S. does not
seem to be disappointed as long as the European suppliers keep away
the Russian arms.
Venezuela's arms procurement trend seems to be heading for a period
of stabilization, after the renovation of the Armed Forces inventory
started in 1971 is accomplished with the delivery of six frigates to the
Navy.
In the short run Venezuela seems to be determined in building an
ammunition and explosives industry aimed at supplying the internal demand
although a few production ventures may occur in the light aircraft and
naval industry. For major arms requirements Venezuela is likely to




A. TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS
Venezuela throughout history has been characterized as being a nation
committed to a peaceful existence with the other nations in the regional
and international context. Nevertheless, Venezuela, as with many other
countries, has created a military establishment with definite missions
of external defense and internal security. The presence of a relatively
modern equipped Armed Forces has represented an asset for a nation like
Venezuela which is trying to develop a economic potential based on its
wealth of natural resources.
The arms transfers to Venezuela during the time period 1962-1975
reflects a pattern of internal security missions and of external pro-
jection as well.
The internal security pattern corresponded to a time when the nation
was resuming a democratic course in the early 1960s. From 1962 to 1968
the Venezuelan Armed Forces were partially committed to deter the illegal
actions of armed dissidents who at the time represented a risk for the
democratic institutions. The type of weapons and the aggregated monetary
value of arms imports for the years 1962-1968 confirm the foregoing
statement.
After 1968 the arms acquisition trend was oriented towards the
renovation and reequipping of the Armed Forces inventory, with items of
external defense projection rather than for internal security mission.
High priced items such as supersonic fighters, tanks, conventional
submarines, fast patrol boats and frigates equipped with surface-to-
surface missiles were received and/or ordered between 1971 to 1975. This

period of sharp increase in the value of arms imports and in the type of
weapons transferred also reflects a ciclycal repetition of the early
1950s when the first modernization of the Venezuelan Armed Forces
occurred.
The 20 years between the two high peaks correspond to a period of
utilization, maintenance, training and other activities that usually
consume the resources allocated to defense. Thus, a replacement pattern
by lots started to take place in the early 1970s with an almost coin-
cidental availability of larger national resources as a result of the
increase in oil price exports in 1973. The arms acquisition trend may
be expected to decrease in the early 1980s after the last lot of items
ordered in the mid 1970s is received. If the same acquisition pattern
is followed a period of lesser investment in major high priced weapons
is expected for the 1980s and up to the mid 1990s. Of course, this
assumes all other factors such as internal stability, regional climate,
and international or regional arms control remain stable.
Among the factors that may vary the arms acquisition patterns of
growing importance, is regional arms control. Following the pace set
in 1974 by the declaration of intentions to limit arms imports made by
the nation members of the Andean Pact, Venezuela in 1977 is working on
a project related to this arms limitation. This project, could be a
renovation and fresh impulse to the question of arms control in Latin
America.
The Venezuelan Government, in its efforts to interact more efficiently
with the international arms suppliers, has formally adopted procedures
normally followed by the military services of the arms producer nations
in their acquisition of major items. The use of different evaluation
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committees and the separation of the evaluation and decision-making
levels make the arms acquisition process less subject to non-military
influences. This kind of effort, which in Venezuela is technically
constrained, is a major step of the military in improving the arms
procurement process, which already is a complex process with the
variety of sources and sophistication in the arms industry.
The multipolarity of the international system in the 1970s as well
as the increase of foreign exchange available to Venezuela after 1973,
is introducing new suppliers into the arms trade. Among those suppliers
are new arms producers and new weapons suitably designed for the
recipient needs, which improves competences and better bargaining
positions for both buyer and seller.
The above situation plus the persistence of the U.S. policy of
limiting the access of selected areas of its arms industry to the
Latin America market in contrast with the European suppliers policies,
have resulted in a diversified weapons inventory for Venezuela.
Venezuela's first incursion into supersonic fighters made France
a new supplier in that field, and the first order for two new conven-
tional submarines went to the Federal Republic of Germany. Those two
arms sellers were having noticeable success in marketing their armed
products in the 1970s, the French Mirage and the German type 209
submarine.
Nevertheless, Venezuela's arms acquisition policy continues to
rely on U.S. as a main source of light aircraft, even with France and
Italy entrance into the helicopter segment. Traditionally the U.S. has
been a reliable source of used military equipment for the Navy and new
non-sophisticated items for the Air Force. Although Venezuela is

leaving aside its policy of procuring used combatant vessels, the U.S
still supplies, under loan agreements or sales, the auxiliary fleet
of the Venezuelan Navy.
The arms inventory in 1975 shows the diversification of weapons
manufacturers and lack of standardization as experienced in the 1950s
,
Therefore, it is expected that the Venezuelan Armed Forces will have
to face significant logistics constraints later as the new materiel
gets older and the multiple manufacturers realign their production





TABLE I. Defense Expenditures, 1938-1961


























Source: Loftus, J. E. [Ref. 34, p. 11]
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TABLE II. Total Oil Revenues and Government
Income, 1963-1975
(In billions of dollars)
OIL GOVERNMENT OIL REVENUE/
YEAR REVENUES i INCOME GOVERNMENT INCOME
1963 $ 1,406 $ 1,969 71%
1964 1,112 1,585 70
1965 1,072 1,614 66
1966 1,109 1,723 64
1967 1,270 1,898 67
1968 1,297 1,950 67
1969 1,218 1,925 63
1970 1,292 2,115 61
1971 1,724 2,586 67
1972 1,811 2,771 65
1973 2,621 3,734 70
1974 8,601 9,952 86
1975 7,590 9,556 79
Source . Data i>rior to 1971. , Venezuela [Ref. 71, P- 8]; for 1971-1972,
Venezuela [Ref. 73, p. 47]; and for data subssequent to 1972 , Venezuela
[Ref. 68, p. IX-3] all data originally in Bolivares and converted to
current dollars using the exchange rate (selling rate) from International
Monetary Fund [Refs. 21 and 22].
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Military Service: Two years
Total Armed Forces: 43,500
National Guard (all volunteer force): 11,500









5 Engineer and Anti-Aircraf t Battalions
Equipment
Tanks (142 AMX-30, 40 AMX-13)
Armored Cars (12 M-8, 15 Shorland)
Artillery (M-101 105 Howitzers, 20 AMX-155)
Anti-Armor Weapons (35 M-18 76 mm)
Helicoperts (5 Alouette III, 6 Bell 47)
Navy
Total Strength: 7,500 including 4,000 marines (4 battalions)
Fleet
4 Destroyers (1 with Seacat SAM) (2 "Nueva Esparta" class and 2 ex-U.S.
"Allen M. Sumner" class)
6 Frigates ("Almirante Clemente" class)
3 Submarines, patrol (2 ex-U.S. "Guppy" class and 1 ex-U.S. "Balao" class)
6 Fast patrol boats, missile/gun (3/0tomat SSM, 3/127 mm Oto-Melara)
10 Large patrol craft (ex-U.S. PC class)
6 Landing ships (1 ex-U.S. LST type, 4 ex-U.S. LSM type, and 1 ex-U.S.
transport)
1 Light transport ("Las Aves" class)
Naval Aviation




1 bomber squadron (26 Canberra)
1 ground-attack squadron (16 OV-10)




2 transport squadrons (4 C-130, 12 C-47, 12 C-123, and 1 HS-748)
46 trainers (2 Mirage III, 12 T-2, 12 Jet Provost, and 20 T-34)
30 Helicopters (15 SA II/III, 10 Bell 47, and 5 Sikorsky S-55)
* Not included: utility aircraft, auxiliary naval vessel, and minor
military equipment
.
Estimates from: (1) SIPRI, The Arms Trade Registers , [Ref. 47, pp. 121-
123]; (2) The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 1976-1977
,
[Ref. 54, p. 68]; (3) Copley, G.R., ed.,
Defense Foreign Affairs Handbook 1976-1977
,
[Ref. 8, pp. 521-522]; and
(4) Jane's Fighting Ships 1976-1977
,
[Ref. 24, p. 758].
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TABLE IV. Defense Expenditures and
Government Expenditures, 1962-1975
(In millions of 1970 dollars)
DEFENSE GOVERNMENT
YEAR EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURES





































TABLE V. Defense Expenditures and Gross
Domestic Product, 1962-1975
(In millions of 1970 dollars)
DEFENSE GROSS DOMESTIC
YEAR EXPENDITURES PRODUCT









































TABLE VI. Defense Expenditures:
Venezuela and Colombia, 1962-1975

















Source: Data for Colombia (in Pesos) and before
1971 drawn from Heare, G. E.
,
[Ref. 18, p. 36];
data for Colombia subsequent to 1970 from U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [Ref. 61,
p. 25]. Data for Colombia converted to 1970
dollars using the consumer price index and the
1970 market exchange rate, adjusted, from:
International Monetary Fund, [Refs. 21 and 22].
Data for Venezuela drawn from Table IV.
VENEZUELA COLOMBIA
















TABLE VII. Major Arms Transfers to Venezuela,
by Suppliers, 1962-1975
Number Supplier Equipment Remarks
Aircraft
6 U.S. Beech Queen Air 65
7 U.S. Grumman HU-16 Albatross
15 U.S. Bell 47
6 U.S. Sikorsky S-55
4 U.S. Lockheed C-130
12 U.S. Cessna 182
16 U.S. Rockwell OV-10
12 U.S. Rockwell T-2
6 U.S. Grumman S-2
15 U.K. BAC jet provost
14 U.K. BAC Canberra B.2/PR.2
1 U.K. HS-748
74 F.R. Germany F-86K
20 France Sud Alouette II/III
15 Canada Dassault Mirage III/5
20 Canada Canadair CF-5A/D
Missiles
100 U.S. NWC Sidewinder
10 U.K. Short Seacat
40 France/Italy Matra/OTO Melara Otomat
Naval Vessels
2 U.S. Destroyer, ex-U.S.
"Allen M. Sumner" class
2 U.S. Submarine, ex-U.S.
"Guppy" type
1 U.S. Repair ship, ex-U.S.
ARL
1 U.S. LST, ex-U.S.
2 U.S. Ocean Tug, ex-U.S.
2 U.S. Survey Ship, ex-U.S.
-6 U.K. Fast patrol boat
"Vosper Thornycroft"
- 2 F.R. Germany Submarine, 209 type















12 B. 2 ex-RAF
Transport














3 with Otomat missiles
On Order




Estimates from: (1) SIPRI, The Arms Trade Registers, [Ref . 47, pp. 121-
123]; (2) Jane's Fighting Ships 1976-77, [Ref. 24, pp. 756-763]; and
(3) Foreign Military Markets Market Intelligence Report, [Ref. 15].
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TABLE VIII. Arms Transfers to Venezuela, by
Major Suppliers, 1962-1975



















* It does not add to 100 because of rounding,
Represents an estimate from: (1) U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, [Ref. 60, p.
A-13]; and (2) U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
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